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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
A jury convicted Thomas Weston and Larry Boone of 
conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine and cocaine base ("crack"). Both have 
appealed alleging numerous trial and sentencing errors. 
The government has also filed a cross-appeal challenging 
Weston's sentence based upon the district court's 
calculation of Weston's Base Offense Level. 
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For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the convictions 
of both defendants on all counts of the indictment, and we 
will also affirm Boone's sentence. However, for reasons set 
forth below, we will vacate Weston's sentence and remand 
for re-sentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
Thomas Weston manufactured crack cocaine and enlisted 
numerous persons to distribute large quantities of crack 
and powder cocaine in Asbury Park, New Jersey between 
1995 and 1998. The evidence at trial established that 
Weston purchased 3 to 5 kilograms of cocaine powder from 
a wholesale distributer in New York City. He converted 
cocaine powder into crack cocaine, delivered cocaine to a 
coterie of street level dealers for distribution in Asbury 
Park, and personally "cooked" at least 200 grams of cocaine 
powder into crack cocaine. 
 
Weston solicited Stewart Mills, a hot dog vendor in 
Asbury Park, to sell crack cocaine for him. However, Mills 
was a reformed drug addict who was strongly opposed to 
drug-dealing. Unbeknownst to Weston, Mills told local law 
enforcement officials about Weston's drug activities and 
agreed to broker controlled drug deals between Weston and 
undercover agents posing as drug buyers. 
 
Weston told Mills that crack should be sold at $900 an 
ounce, and that Mills would have to sell a minimum of 4 
ounces. Weston also gave Mills code words and numbers 
that Mills was to use when communicating with Weston 
about drug transactions. Weston eventually agreed to sell 
four ounces of crack to a buyer whom Mills introduced as 
a drug user named "Malik." Malik was actually Gregory 
Hilton, an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency. Mills and Weston agreed that the sale would occur 
on July 11, 1997, in Howell, New Jersey, at a flea market 
known as the "Collingswood Auction." 
 
Thereafter, Mills paged Weston from a public telephone 
as instructed by the DEA agents. He entered the number 
"3600" which represented the price (i.e. $3,600) that Agent 
Hilton was willing to pay for 4 ounces of crack as Weston 
had requested. Weston called Mills back and arranged a 
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meeting at Weston's home in Asbury Park, and Mills and 
Weston then met to finalize the arrangements. 
 
Weston next contacted Curtis Farris (a/k/a "C-Allah") 
and offered him $500 to deliver the drugs to the buyer at 
the Collingswood Auction. Farris agreed and told Weston 
that he would have someone else make the actual delivery. 
Farris selected Larry Boone (a/k/a "God Supreme"). Boone 
had sold cocaine for Farris before, and Farris knew that 
Boone and Mills were friendly. 
 
Farris offered Boone $100 and an eighth of an ounce of 
cocaine to deliver the package of cocaine to Collingswood 
Auction and collect the sales price. Boone agreed. 
Meanwhile, Weston partially reneged on his agreement with 
Mills to provide four ounces of crack cocaine, and 
unilaterally substituted 111 grams (approximately four 
ounces) of cocaine powder for delivery to Farris. On the 
afternoon of July 11, 1997, Farris drove Boone to the 
Collingswood Auction in a black Jeep. En route, Farris gave 
Boone a brown paper bag. That bag contained a smaller 
plastic bag containing 111 grams of powder cocaine that 
Weston had supplied. 
 
Law enforcement officials who had set up surveillance at 
the Collingswood Auction saw Weston and two other people 
arrive 2:45 p.m. Farris and Boone arrived about ten 
minutes later. Boone approached Mills and said he was 
"there to do the deal." Mills introduced Farris and Boone to 
Agent Hilton, posing as "Malik." Hilton accompanied Boone 
to Farris' car as directed. Once inside the car, Boone took 
a clear plastic bag from his jacket. The bag contained the 
distinctive white cocaine powder. Agent Hilton never saw 
the brown paper bag. 
 
Although Weston had set a price of $3,600, unbeknownst 
to Farris, Boone demanded $3,700 from Agent Hilton. 
Hilton briefly complained about the increase but ultimately 
paid it as he did not want to compromise the investigation 
by walking away from the transaction. Hilton agreed and 
Boone handed him the plastic bag of cocaine which Agent 
Hilton opened and examined in Boone's presence inside the 
Jeep. After inspecting the cocaine in front of Boone, Hilton 
produced $3,700 in cash which he counted in Boone's 
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presence and handed to Boone so that Boone could recount 
it. After Hilton left the Jeep, Boone surreptitiously skimmed 
$100 from the $3,700 payment, and drove off followed by 
Weston who had driven another car to the flea market to 
observe the transaction.1 
 
About a week later, Boone came to Mills' home. Boone 
announced that he "was back rolling," which meant that he 
was selling cocaine again. He informed Mills that he (Boone) 
had a "connection" and could get Mills all the"weight" 
(large quantities of cocaine) that Mills wanted. During that 
meeting, Boone gave Mills his "business card." 
 
Several weeks later, again acting at the request of DEA, 
Mills brokered another sale of four ounces of cocaine from 
Weston to Agent Hilton posing as "Malik." During a 
surreptitiously recorded conversation on July 22, 1997, 
Mills told Weston that Malik wanted to buy four ounces of 
crack for $3,600 during the following week. Weston again 
gave Farris powder cocaine, rather than crack. However, 
Farris used Herbert Jones to make the delivery to Hilton 
because he could not find Boone. Jones made the delivery 
on August 1, 1997. This time the transfer occurred in a 
restaurant that Mills owned. 
 
Mills again met Weston on October 4, 1997. The meeting 
occurred inside a bar, and during the meeting Mills (who 
was equipped with a hidden recorder) asked Weston why he 
had delivered powder cocaine on July 11 and August 1 
rather than the crack that Malik requested. Weston initially 
claimed that he no longer "cooked up crack." However, 
Weston then directed Mills out of the bar so they could 
speak without being overheard. Using slang terms for 
manufacturing crack ("cooking," "laying out," "bringing 
back"), Weston told Mills that he (Weston) would convert 
the four ounces of cocaine that he most recently sold to 
Malik into four and one-half ounces of crack. Weston also 
told Mills that he could provide Mills with additional crack 
cocaine if he wanted it. Later, Weston told Mills to pick up 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Surveillance officers captured the entire transaction on videotape, and 
Hilton wore a hidden audio transmitter that allowed his conversation to 
be recorded by the agents conducting surveillance. 
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some powder cocaine, and bring it to Weston's home so 
that Weston could "cook it up." 
 
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
Weston, Boone and Jones were arrested by warrant and 
complaint on June 3, 1998. Farris was arrested on 
September 11, 1998. On October 27, 1998, a federal grand 
jury issued a superseding indictment charging Weston, 
Boone, Farris and Jones with conspiring to distribute, and 
possessing with intent to distribute, more than 5 grams of 
cocaine base (crack cocaine) and more than 200 grams of 
cocaine, contrary to 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), in violation of 21 
U.S.C. S 846. The government also filed an enhanced 
penalty information against Weston, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
SS 841(b)(1)(B) and 851(a)(1). The requested enhancement 
was based upon Weston's 1992 sentence of four years 
incarceration in Maryland for possession of 39 grams of 
crack cocaine with intent to distribute. 
 
Farris entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed 
to cooperate with the government and plead guilty to the 
superseding indictment. Jones also pleaded guilty. Boone 
and Weston proceeded to trial where the jury convicted 
them of the charged conspiracy. 
 
Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office calculated 
Weston's Adjusted and Total Offense Level at 40. 2 In light of 
Weston's five criminal history points, and Criminal History 
Category of III, Weston's Guidelines Range was 360 months 
to life imprisonment. Following three days of sentencing 
hearings, the district court reduced the Total Offense Level 
from 40 to 32.3 The court refused to consider any of the 
crack cocaine that Weston cooked as "relevant conduct" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Probation Office used the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines Manual for 
Weston and Boone. 
 
3. It is not clear from the briefs or the transcript of the proceedings 
why 
the district court reduced the Total Offense Level to 32. The only 
relevance that it may have for our purposes is the Apprendi claim that 
we discuss below. However, as we discuss below, inasmuch as Weston 
is exposed to a life sentence because of a prior drug felony conviction, 
Apprendi does not apply. 
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under the Guidelines. This reduced the Guideline Range 
calculated by the pre-sentence report by more than half. 
The district court also reduced Weston's Criminal History 
Category to II, resulting in a Guidelines Range of 135 to 
168 months. The district court then imposed a sentence of 
168 months and a term of supervised release of 8 years. 
 
Because Boone had been convicted of two previous drug- 
trafficking felonies in New Jersey state courts, as well as 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the district court 
found that Boone was a "career offender" under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. The court assigned Boone a Base 
Offense Level of 32, and a Criminal History Category of VI. 
The court declined Boone's request for a three level 
downward adjustment for "acceptance of responsibility" 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, but the district court agreed 
that the resulting Guidelines Range of 210 to 262 months 
was too high. Therefore, the court granted Boone a three 
level downward departure, and imposed a custodial 
sentence of 151 months -- the bottom of the resulting 
sentencing range -- followed by a four-year term of 
supervised release. 
 
Weston and Boone have filed appeals, at Nos. 99-5695 
and 99-5439 respectively. In Weston's case, the government 
has filed a cross-appeal (No. 99-5894), based upon the 
district court's failure to attribute any crack cocaine to 
Weston in calculating his applicable Offense Level. We will 
separately discuss each defendant's appeal and the 
government's cross-appeal. 
 
III. WESTON'S APPEAL 
 
Weston's counsel has raised three claims of trial error. In 
addition, we have permitted Weston to file a pro se brief, in 
which he has raised three claims of sentencing error. Each 
assignment of error is discussed separately. 
 
1. The District Court Erred by Allowing Testimony 
Regarding Threats Against a Government Witness. 
 
In his counseled brief, Weston argues that the district 
court improperly allowed the government to cross-examine 
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two defense witnesses regarding Weston's efforts to coerce 
Farris into providing false exculpatory testimony for 
Weston. 
 
After Weston was indicted, he tried to get Farris to sign 
an affidavit in which Farris was to swear that he did not 
know Weston. When Farris returned to prison following his 
guilty plea, he found a letter in his cell.4 The letter 
threatened harm to Farris and his family if Farris testified 
against Weston, and it instructed Farris to recopy a portion 
of the letter and sign it in his own handwriting. The portion 
of the letter that was to be recopied stated that Weston had 
not committed the crimes he was charged with. Farris 
believed that the letter came from Weston. Farris did copy 
a portion of the letter as requested, but he added a 
sentence in which he asked the reader to notify law 
enforcement if Farris was the victim of foul play. Farris 
then threw away the original letter. 
 
Farris later spoke to Robert Perry, an inmate who worked 
in the prison library and was helping Weston prepare for 
trial. Perry told Farris that he should hope for a long prison 
sentence, because otherwise "somebody is going to kill 
you." Farris responded by telling Perry that he would 
withdraw his guilty plea and refuse to testify against 
Weston. Farris hoped that Perry would relay that message 
to Weston. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Farris was summoned to the prison 
library where he encountered Weston, Boone and Perry. 
Weston had Farris' letter and directed Farris to rewrite the 
letter omitting the reference to foul play. About one week 
later, Farris was again summoned to the prison library 
where Boone demanded that Farris write a similar letter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. According to the government, after Farris received the letter he asked 
another inmate named Gavin if he had written the letter. Gavin denied 
having written the letter but warned Farris that he had better not 
cooperate with the government because Farris' life and Farris' family's 
lives will be in danger. Government's Br. at 15 n.5. Presumably, Gavin 
is the same person Weston calls Garrin. According to Weston, Garrin is 
the only person who Farris actually identified as threatening him, but 
who the government never directly associated with Weston. Weston's 
Counseled Br. at 7. 
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exonerating him (Boone). Farris was transferred to another 
prison after telling law enforcement authorities about the 
threats. According to the government, Farris was terrified 
by these threats, and did not want to testify. 
 
At trial, Weston denied ever threatening Farris, or ever 
seeing the letter that purported to exonerate Weston. 
Weston also testified that when he saw Farris in prison, 
Farris was surprised that Weston had been charged. 
According to Weston, Farris had suggested that Jones had 
implicated Weston, and Farris volunteered to exonerate 
Weston. 
 
To further contradict Farris' testimony about Weston's 
intimidation, Weston presented several inmates who had 
been incarcerated with Weston and/or Farris. Johnny 
Davenport testified on direct examination that at the time 
of trial he had been an inmate in the same prison as 
Weston. He had known Weston for 18 years and Farris for 
25 years. Davenport claimed that Farris admitted to him 
that the government wanted Farris to "lie on[Weston]." 
Davenport further testified that Farris told him that Weston 
was not involved in the drug conspiracy. 
 
On cross-examination, Davenport testified, without 
objection, that he was six feet tall, and weighed about 225 
pounds. When the prosecutor asked Davenport whether he 
made use of this time in jail by "keeping in good shape," 
Weston's counsel objected to "personal observations of the 
prosecutor." The objection was overruled. The prosecutor 
then inquired, without objection, whether Davenport lifted 
weights in jail. Davenport claimed that he did not. Then, 
again without objection, the prosecutor elicited testimony 
that Davenport had been convicted of drug-trafficking 
offenses and assault. 
 
Weston also called Nard Henderson as a defense witness. 
Henderson testified on direct examination that he spoke to 
Farris while the two were in a holding cell at the Federal 
Courthouse in Trenton, New Jersey. According to 
Henderson, Farris told him Weston "had nothing to do with 
it." Henderson also claimed that Farris "was going to write 
a letter, clearing [Weston]." On cross-examination, 
Henderson testified without objection that he was six feet, 
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two and one-half inches tall, weighed 280 pounds, that he 
had an extensive criminal record that included drug- 
trafficking and resisting arrest, and that he was a"career 
offender." 
 
Weston argues that the cross-examination of these 
witnesses was an improper attempt to "convey an image in 
the minds of the jurors that Farris was continually living 
under the threat of violent physical harm rendered by 
Weston's prison henchmen." Weston's Counseled Br. at 6-7. 
In Weston's view, "the harm visited upon [him], despite the 
incriminat[ing] evidence adduced below, mandates reversal 
by the Honorable Court." Id. at 7. 
 
At the outset, we note that Weston's only objection to this 
line of cross-examination was that it exceeded the scope of 
direct, and that the questions were based upon improper 
observations by the prosecutor. Consequently, our scope of 
review as to these issues is whether the district court 
committed plain error in allowing the testimony. United 
States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). "[W]e 
may reverse only if we find error . . . so serious as to 
undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and 
contribute to a miscarriage of justice." United States v. 
Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1994)(citation omitted). 
 
       A plain error is clear or obvious. In most cases, an 
       error will be deemed to have affected substantial rights 
       where it is prejudicial. Prejudicial error, affecting 
       substantial rights, must have affected the outcome of 
       the District Court proceedings. The inquiry concerning 
       prejudice on plain error review is similar to our inquiry 
       into harmless error with the important difference that 
       the defendant, rather than the government, bears the 
       burden of persuasion in a plain error analysis. 
 
Id. at 898 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here 
Weston never even attempts to show how the disputed 
testimony constitutes plain error. He merely claims that he 
was harmed by the "improper" cross-examination. We do 
not believe this testimony amounts to plain error, and he 
has not met his burden of showing that it was plain error.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We do not think the court erred in allowing this inquiry. However, 
even if we assume that the district court did err, the error clearly did 
not 
affect the outcome of the trial because Farris, Perry, and Gavin (or 
"Garrin") also testified about Weston's threats. 
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2. The District Court Erred by Allowing 
       the Government to Cross-Examine Witnesses About 
       Weston's Prior Drug-Trafficking Activities. 
 
Weston's counsel also argues that the district court 
improperly allowed the government to cross-examine two 
witnesses about Weston's prior, uncharged drug-trafficking. 
Weston called Rayfield James as a character witness, and 
asked him about Weston's reputation in the community for 
truthfulness and honesty. James replied that Weston is 
"straightforward," and "a man of his word." On cross- 
examination, James testified, without objection, that "with 
me, . . . [Weston had] a reputation for being law-abiding," 
and truthful. James also testified on cross-examination 
that he was unaware that Weston had previously been 
convicted of dealing crack cocaine, but that, even if he had 
been aware, it would not have changed his opinion of 
Weston's character. 
 
However, Weston objected when the government asked 
James if he was aware that the nightclub Weston owned in 
Asbury Park had been the subject of a search warrant 
executed by narcotics agents. The objection was overruled 
and the district court immediately instructed the jury that 
the question was permissible "not for the truth of any such 
assertion but rather as it may affect the opinion of the 
witness." James then testified that he was not aware of any 
search warrant and that even if he had been, it would not 
have affected his opinion of Weston. 
 
Weston's counsel argues that allowing questions about 
Weston's prior conviction and the search of his night club 
amounted to "fatal error." According to counsel, "[t]he 
inescapable conclusion is that the government knew of 
other narcotic activity on [Weston's] part that was not part 
of [his] trial" and "a juror could only be left with the 
thought that Weston was a continuing target for narcotics 
agents." Weston's Counseled Br. at 8. We disagree.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We review for plain error those claims that were not preserved in the 
district court, United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2000), 
and for abuse of discretion for those claims that were preserved. United 
States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that: 
 
       In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of 
       character of a person is admissible, proof may be made 
       by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the 
       form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is 
       allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 405(a)(italics added). Therefore, the 
government could inquire about James's awareness of 
Weston's prior conviction and the execution of the search 
warrant at Weston's night club once Weston put his 
character in issue. See United States v. Scholl , 166 F.3d 
964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1999)(approving cross-examination of 
opinion character witness by reference to defendant's 
specific acts of misconduct). The district court has broad 
discretion regarding the cross-examination of character 
witnesses, and the court did not abuse that discretion in 
allowing the government to challenge the character 
testimony that Weston offered. United States v. Furst, 886 
F.2d 558, 578 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Furthermore, inasmuch as counsel did not object to 
inquiry into Weston's prior drug-trafficking conviction 
during James' cross-examination, Weston again has the 
burden of establishing plain error. 
 
The testimony regarding the search of Weston's night 
club did not amount to plain error. For one thing, Mills 
testified, without objection, that he had purchased drugs 
there. Accordingly, we fail to see how inquiring into James' 
knowledge of a search of that night club could have 
prejudiced Weston; especially given the district court's 
prompt limiting instruction. See United States v. Curtis, 644 
F.2d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 1981)(no reversible error for 
improper cross-examination of a reputation witness which 
elicited only information that had already been introduced 
into evidence). 
 
Similarly, Duval Moore testified on direct examination 
that he and Farris were lifelong friends, and cell mates in 
jail. Moore told the jury that Farris told him that Farris had 
a deal that included falsely implicating Weston in the 
charged drug offenses. On cross-examination, Moore 
continued to claim that Farris told him that the FBI 
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instructed Farris to lie about Weston. Moore also claimed 
that Farris gave him a letter in which Farris stated that he 
wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he knew he 
would have to lie for the government. However, according to 
Moore, law enforcement officials refused to allow Farris to 
withdraw his plea. 
 
The government attacked Moore's credibility by eliciting 
(without objection) that Moore had several convictions for 
cocaine trafficking and violent crimes. Moore refused to 
identify his suppliers during that line of questioning, and 
the government responded by asking: "isn't it a fact that 
you distributed Thomas Weston's cocaine and you're 
covering for him here?" Moore denied that assertion and 
Weston's counsel stated he objected "unless the prosecutor 
has some proof of that." At a sidebar, the government then 
proffered that Farris had informed investigators that he 
once delivered a package of cocaine from Weston to Moore 
for subsequent distribution by Moore. Weston's counsel 
responded with a motion for a mistrial, "just for the record," 
which the court denied. 
 
Weston now argues that testimony was "highly 
inflammatory, . . . meant to prejudice, and [constitutes] 
reversible error." However, at trial Weston did not object to 
the inquiry because of its inflammatory or prejudicial 
nature. Rather, counsel argued that the question was not 
permissible unless the government had proof of the 
assertion. Accordingly, we once again review for plain error. 
Given the context of the cross-examination, we conclude 
that the district court did not commit any error in allowing 
the inquiry -- let alone, plain error. Evidence that Moore 
and Weston had been drug dealing partners was relevant to 
Moore's possible bias in favor of Weston. See United States 
v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)(evidence regarding joint 
membership of witness and defendant in criminal 
organization was properly admitted to establish possible 
bias of witness in favor of defendant). In addition, the jury 
was properly instructed that answers, not questions, 
constitute evidence, and Moore denied selling drugs for 
Weston.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In explaining why this evidence did not violate the strictures of Rule 
404(b), we again emphasize the danger inherent in this kind of evidence. 
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Moreover, there was significant evidence of Weston's 
involvement in the drug trade. Mills testified that he saw 
Weston distribute drugs, that he purchased drugs from 
Weston, and that Weston solicited him to sell drugs. Farris 
testified that he purchased drugs with Weston. Weston 
admitted that he had previously manufactured crack 
cocaine, and Weston was captured on audiotape discussing 
the charged conspiracy with Mills. Thus, the district court 
did not err in allowing the limited inquiry into whether 
Moore once sold drugs for Weston to establish the 
relationship between the two. See United States v. Godinez, 
114 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 1997)(no plain error for 
improper question on cross-examination of defense witness 
about whether defendant was involved in drug-dealing, 
where cooperating co-conspirators had previously testified 
extensively that defendant was the leader of a drug- 
trafficking organization). 
 
3. The District Court Erred by Refusing 
       to Strike All References to Crack Cocaine. 
 
At the close of the government's case, Weston moved to 
strike "any illusions to crack cocaine" from the jury's 
consideration. He argued that the government's evidence 
proved that Weston actually sold Agent Hilton cocaine 
powder, not crack cocaine. However, the district court 
denied Weston's motion. Here, Weston's counsel argues 
that "injecting the specter of crack evokes the ire of any 
jury," and is "so inflammatory that the mere 
unsubstantiated allegation of involvement may be enough 
to convict." Weston's Counseled Br. at 10. He therefore 
asserts that the district court committed reversible error in 
denying his motion. 
 
As recited earlier, the superseding indictment charged 
that Weston, Farris, Boone and Jones conspired to 
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
See United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992) 
("Although the government will hardly admit it, the reasons proffered to 
admit prior bad act evidence . . . is often mixed between an urge to show 
some other consequential fact as well as to impugn the defendant's 
character."). 
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than 5 grams of crack cocaine and more than 200 grams of 
cocaine. Although the substance that Weston actually 
delivered was cocaine powder, more than sufficient evidence 
was introduced at trial to support the conviction for 
conspiring to manufacture and deliver crack cocaine. The 
government produced testimony that Weston had, on two 
occasions, agreed to supply crack cocaine to agent Hilton, 
and Weston offered to personally convert the powder to 
crack when Mills (the go-between) reminded Weston that 
Hilton wanted crack. 
 
At trial, Weston denied furnishing the cocaine that was 
delivered to Hilton. However, the evidence certainly 
supported the jury's conclusion that Weston was 
responsible for that delivery. Weston's argument is really 
bottomed upon an implicit assertion that he cannot be 
convicted of conspiring to distribute crack without evidence 
that he actually delivered that substance as opposed to 
powder cocaine. However, one can certainly conspire to 
deliver and distribute crack without the actual distribution 
or delivery if the charge has otherwise been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. See United States v. DeSimone, 119 
F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1997). Consequently, the district 
court properly refused counsel's motion to strike"any 
illusions to crack cocaine" from the jury's consideration.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The legal basis for counsel's motion is not clear. In the district 
court, 
he relied upon Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. However, we do not believe that rule 
gives the district court the authority to strike evidence from the jury's 
consideration. Rather, it authorizes the district court to "order the 
entry 
of judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the 
indictment . . . after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a conviction for such offense." Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 
29. On appeal, counsel does not cite to any specific authority. Rather, he 
characterizes his motion as one "to strike crack cocaine from the 
indictment." Weston's Counseled Br. at 10. However, Weston never 
mentioned the indictment in his motion to strike in the district court and 
he never mentioned Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), which governs requests to 
strike allegations from an indictment. In any event, we have ignored the 
procedural intricacies and reached the merits of the argument. 
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4. The PSR Erroneously Calculated the Amount of 
       Drugs Attributable to Weston. 
 
In his pro se brief challenging his sentence, Weston 
argues that the district court erred at sentencing by 
attributing 5 kilograms of cocaine powder to him that he 
purchased in New York City.9 In Weston's view, only the 
220 grams of cocaine powder that he caused to be delivered 
to Agent Hilton during the two controlled buys identified in 
the indictment can be attributed to him under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
However, a sentence in a criminal conspiracy is based 
upon all relevant conduct and not merely offense conduct. 
See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 228 
(7th Cir.) (Since defendant was convicted of conspiring to 
distribute controlled substances, she is responsible for all 
"drugs [she] personally handled or anticipated handling, 
and, under the relevant conduct rubric, for drugs involved 
in additional acts that were reasonably foreseeable by 
[her] and were committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.")(citation omitted). The evidence here easily 
established that Weston's relevant conduct included the 
purchase and sale of approximately 5 kilograms of cocaine 
powder. 
 
Weston and Farris first met in the autumn of 1995 inside 
Farris' telephone pager store in Asbury Park. Weston had 
four pagers set to a single telephone number which he used 
in dispatching his confederates to make cocaine sales. After 
Weston told Farris that he was unhappy with his cocaine 
suppliers, Farris drove Weston to New York City to meet a 
man referred to as "Poppy", a Dominican from whom Farris 
had been buying cocaine in lots of 200 to 700 grams. 10 
 
Farris introduced Weston to Poppy as a "steady", and 
described Weston as a high volume cocaine buyer. Weston 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "When . . . construction of the Sentencing Guidelines is required on 
appeal, the standard of review is plenary." United States v. Greene, 212 
F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 2000). Review of the district court's findings of 
facts with regard to the sentence is clear error. United States v. Yeaman, 
194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
10. Farris diluted the cocaine and then sold the diluted product. 
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and Farris each gave Poppy $4,000 to purchase a total of 
400 grams of cocaine. Thereafter, on five or six occasions, 
Weston gave Farris cash in the average amount of $6,000 
to purchase additional cocaine from Poppy. Farris charged 
Weston 10 grams of cocaine (worth about $300) in return 
for purchasing $6,000 to $7,000 of cocaine from Poppy. On 
three or four other occasions, Weston bought cocaine from 
Poppy for Farris in amounts of up to $8,000, and charged 
Farris the same ten gram fee for that "service." On six or 
seven other occasions, Weston went to Poppy and made 
unspecified purchases of his own. 
 
In early 1996, Weston and Farris went together to New 
York City, where each purchased between $6,000 and 
$8,000 of cocaine from Poppy. The evidence established 
that Weston and Poppy appeared to be well acquainted with 
each other. Weston last used Farris to purchase cocaine 
from Poppy in late 1997 or early 1998. Farris' testimony 
established that Weston's bulk cocaine purchases from 
Poppy to Weston and/or Weston and Farris amounted to 
between 4.8 and 5.7 kilograms of cocaine. The Sentencing 
Guidelines provide that "[t]ypes and quantities of drugs not 
specified in the count of conviction may be considered in 
determining the offense level. See S 1B1.3(a)(2)(Relevant 
Conduct)." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, Application Note 12. 
 
Relevant Conduct for a drug trafficking conviction 
includes not only all controlled substances involved"during 
the commission of the offense of conviction," but also those 
substances involved as "part of the same course of conduct 
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(a)(2). Consequently, all of Weston's drug- 
trafficking that was part of the same course of conduct or 
common scheme must be included in the drug quantity, 
regardless of whether a particular transaction resulted in a 
conviction. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 3 
(application of S 1B1.3(a)(2) "does not require the defendant, 
in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts."). 
 
Weston's multiple drug-trafficking offenses, including the 
offense of conviction, and his purchases from Poppy, were 
part of a "common scheme or plan," because they were 
"substantially connected to each other by at least one 
common factor, such as . . . common accomplices, . .. [or 
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a] common purpose." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 
9(A). Weston and Farris were clearly accomplices in the 
offense of conviction and in their joint purchases of cocaine 
powder from Poppy. Farris introduced Weston to Poppy, 
identified Weston as a reliable bulk purchaser of cocaine, 
purchased cocaine from Poppy for Weston, and gave 
Weston money to purchase cocaine from Poppy. Farris also 
arranged for Boone and Jones to deliver Weston's cocaine 
in the charged conspiracy. Therefore, the district court 
properly held Weston accountable for all the cocaine that 
he purchased from Poppy; either alone or jointly with 
Farris. 
 
The purchases from Poppy and the offense of conviction 
also "qualifi[ed] as part of the same course of conduct 
[because] they [were] sufficiently related or connected to 
each other as to warrant the conclusion that they were part 
of [an] . . . ongoing series of offenses." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, 
Application Note 9(B). The conduct all occurred within the 
small geographic area in or near Asbury Park, involved 
cocaine that Weston sold through intermediaries, and it 
involved the same co-conspirators, i.e., Weston and Farris. 
 
Accordingly, we find no merit in Weston's claim that the 
5 kilograms of cocaine purchased in New York should not 
be attributed to him under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
5. The District Court Erred by Crediting Farris' 
       Testimony on the Volume of Drugs Weston 
       Distributed. 
 
In his pro se brief, Weston relies upon United States v. 
Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993), in arguing that the 
district court committed clear error by crediting Farris' 
testimony regarding the volume of cocaine that he and 
Weston purchased from Poppy. Weston claims that Farris' 
testimony was internally inconsistent. 
 
In Miele, the district court's estimate of drug quantity 
rested upon the unsworn hearsay statement of an 
informant. That informant later contradicted that estimate 
in sworn testimony he gave during the trial of Miele's co- 
defendants. We found that the "vast disparity between [the 
informant's] estimate in the PSI and the significantly lower 
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estimates he provided at the co-defendants' trial cast [ ] 
doubt on the reliability of the PSI's estimate." Id. at 664. 
Since the district court never explained why it accepted the 
informant's higher estimate in calculating the drug 
quantity, we remanded for resentencing. Id. 
 
Here, however, the district court based the volume of 
cocaine on Farris' sworn trial testimony, and the court 
concluded that the testimony was reliable. The testimony 
remained unshaken after vigorous cross-examination. 
Moreover, the "vast disparity" in estimates of drug quantity 
that we found so troubling in Miele is absent here. Farris' 
testimony was neither speculative nor contradictory. 
Weston argues that Farris' testimony was contradictory 
because Farris first testified on direct that he and Weston 
first went to New York to buy cocaine from Poppy in 1995, 
but then, on cross-examination, testified that the first trip 
was in 1996. Although Farris did initially testify that the 
first trip was in 1995, he immediately corrected himself and 
explained that it was in 1996. Moreover, even if he had not 
done so, the resulting discrepancy would not have been 
analogous to the discrepancies in Miele. Slight memory 
lapses hardly compel a sentencing court to completely 
reject testimony about drug quantity. This is particularly 
true where, as here, it was immediately corrected, and 
involves an issue that is not at all relevant to the substance 
of the testimony about drug quantity. See United States v. 
Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1999)(rejecting 
argument that district court, in calculating the drug 
amount, should not have relied on testimony of an 
informant whose "testimony regarding dates and times was 
fuzzy," because "such credibility calls are grist for the trial 
court's mill."). Given Farris' familiarity with drug 
transactions, his estimate of volume was appropriately 
considered by the district court. It is "not unreasonable . . . 
to believe that the testimony of a man experienced in drug 
deals was sufficient to establish an appropriate drug 
quantity." Id. 
 
Weston also alleges that Farris' testimony should not be 
credited because of an inconsistency regarding the 
wholesale price of cocaine. Farris said that he paid $20 a 
gram for cocaine that he purchased from Poppy in New 
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York in bulk. He also said that he and Weston paid Poppy 
$4,000 each for "close to half a key [kilogram]." Finally, 
Farris testified that he and Weston would charge each other 
$300 to pick up cocaine from Poppy, and ten grams of 
cocaine (i.e., $30 a gram) were accepted in payment. 
 
However, as the government points out, Farris' accounts 
are easily reconciled. At $20 a gram when bought in bulk, 
400 grams, costing $8,000, ($4,000 from Weston and 
$4,000 from Farris) is relatively "close to half a key," i.e., 
500 grams. Farris testimony that smaller quantities (i.e. 10 
grams) cost more (i.e. $30 a gram) than bulk purchases 
simply reflects the "economies of scale" that apparently 
operated in this illegal market. 
 
Finally, Weston complains that Farris' testimony should 
not be credited because Farris did not give a dollar amount 
for each of the quantities of cocaine that either he or 
Weston purchased from Poppy. Therefore, argues Weston, 
the district court's estimate of the total volume of drugs 
was clearly erroneous. We disagree. Farris recited particular 
dollar amounts for several of the purchases, estimated the 
average amount of money spent during other transactions, 
and estimated the total number of transactions. This is 
sufficient to support the district court's estimate of the total 
amount of cocaine that Weston and Farris bought from 
Poppy. See United States v. Grandados, 202 F.3d 1025, 
1029 (8th Cir. 2000)(not clear error for district court to 
estimate unknown quantities of drugs involved in certain 
transactions by reference to known quantities involved in 
other, similar transactions). 
 
6. The District Court Erred by Enhancing Weston's 
       Sentence for Obstruction of Justice. 
 
Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for 
a two level enhancement if a defendant "willfully obstructed 
or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the 
administration of justice." Examples of obstruction include: 
"threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully 
influencing . . . a witness, or attempting to do so;" 
"suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury"; and "other 
conduct prohibited by the obstruction of justice provisions 
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under Title 18, United States Code." U.S.S.G.S 3C1.1, 
Application Note 4(a). 
 
In the Presentence Report, the Probation Office found 
that Weston obstructed justice and recommended a two 
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.l. This was based 
upon the letter that Weston attempted to coerce Farris into 
signing. PSR P 38. Weston objected, claiming that Farris' 
account of the circumstances surrounding the purported 
letter were not credible. However, the district court 
observed Farris' testimony and concluded otherwise. The 
court concluded "this is one of the most clear and 
convincing episodes of obstruction of justice that I have 
seen." The court found that it even rose to a level that 
exceeded the degree of obstruction encompassed within the 
"heartland" of S 3C1. It would have been difficult to 
conclude otherwise. 
 
In his pro se brief, Weston challenges Farris' credibility 
by pointing to Farris' cross-examination testimony about a 
gold cadillac Weston purportedly owned. However, Weston's 
ownership of a gold Cadillac has absolutely nothing to do 
with his conviction. The district concluded that Farris 
testified credibly about Weston's obstruction activity, and 
we afford that finding deference. United States v. Igbonwa, 
120 F.3d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1997). Given the credible 
testimony that Weston directly and indirectly attempted to 
coerce Farris into signing a copy of the aforementioned 
exculpatory letter, the district court did not err in 
concluding that a two level enchantment for obstruction of 
justice was warranted. 
 
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S CROSS-APPEAL 
IN WESTON'S CASE 
 
The government argues that the district court erred in 
reducing Weston's Offense Level and Guidelines Range by 
ignoring credible evidence that he manufactured and 
distributed at least 200 grams of crack cocaine. The 
government claims that Weston's Offense Level should be 
increased at least to the level applicable to the 200 grams 
of crack cocaine that Weston manufactured on a single 
occasion. 
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The government relies upon the crack that Weston 
personally manufactured from the powder he and Farris 
purchased from Poppy in New York City. Earlier, we noted 
that Weston and Farris bought cocaine powder in New York 
City from Poppy for distribution in Asbury Park. Weston 
told Farris that crack cocaine sold faster on the street than 
cocaine powder. Weston also told Farris that he (Weston) 
personally manufactured crack from cocaine powder and 
could produce 140 grams of crack from every 100 grams of 
cocaine powder used. After one of Farris' customers 
complained about some cocaine he had purchased from 
Farris, Farris went to Weston to ask if Weston could 
convert cocaine powder into crack. When Farris 
encountered Weston, Weston was in the middle of 
preparing a batch of crack. Farris testified that he saw 
"maybe a couple of hundred grams" of powder cocaine on 
a plate, and some baking soda. In Farris' presence, Weston 
placed the mixture of cocaine powder and baking soda into 
a pot of boiling water and held the pot over the stove. After 
the water boiled off, the hard, off-white crack cocaine 
remained as a residue in the pot. Farris was very familiar 
with the appearance of crack having ingested it in the past. 
 
On another occasion, while Weston was selling Farris 
cocaine powder on the street, Weston dropped a clear 
plastic bag containing 7 to 10 grams of crack cocaine on 
the ground. 
 
Weston also repeatedly solicited Mills to sell crack 
cocaine for him. He told Mills that Mills could multiply his 
daily income from hot dog sales (about $150 a day) by ten 
or twenty times if he sold crack cocaine for Weston. Weston 
said that a street-level dealer for his drug-trafficking 
organization could earn at least $1,500 and as much as 
$3,000 a day in commissions from the sales of crack 
cocaine. 
 
Weston also told Mills that Weston could "lay out" or 
cook powder cocaine in order to transform it into"rock 
cocaine," i.e., crack. Weston said he could convert an ounce 
of powder cocaine into an ounce and a half of crack. On 
one occasion, Weston showed Mills some crack cocaine and 
told Mills, "this is the game you need to get into to make a 
lot more money." 
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Mills sold hot dogs from a pushcart in front of a night 
club called the "Mishypoo." The club was frequented by 
numerous crack dealers, including those working for 
Weston. The dealers would sell crack directly outside the 
night club, in plain view of Mills. When the crack dealers 
went inside the night club, they would occasionally ask 
Mills to come into the bar and tell them when Weston 
arrived so they could get their inventory from him. Mills 
testified that Weston drove to the club two to three times a 
week. When he arrived, he would summon the dealers to 
his car. After a few minutes they would leave with packages 
of crack cocaine to sell. 
 
In addition, Mills later brokered the two aforementioned 
crack deals between Weston and Agent Hilton. During his 
direct testimony, Weston admitted to previously 
manufacturing crack, and being convicted for offenses 
involving crack in Maryland several years earlier. He 
testified that it was common to refer to the manufacture of 
crack using terms such as: "cook" cocaine,"lay it out," and 
"bring it back." He explained that the process requires 
boiling cocaine powder, baking soda and water together and 
that if a large amount of baking soda was used, the amount 
of crack produced would exceed the amount of cocaine 
powder used. That is consistent with Mills' and Farris' 
testimony about the crack Weston manufactured. 
 
The PSR stated that the trial evidence established that 
Weston (personally or through Farris) obtained a minimum 
of 5 kilograms of powder cocaine from Poppy, the New York 
City supplier. PSR P 31. According to the PSR, a 
preponderance of evidence established that Weston 
converted most of the 5 kilograms of cocaine powder into 
crack. Id. The gram weight of that crack was at least equal 
to the gram weight of the powder cocaine. Id.  Accordingly, 
the PSR recommended that Weston be held accountable for 
at least 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. Id. The PSR thus 
applied a Base Offense level of 38 under U.S.S.G.  
S 2D1.1(c)(1).11 PSR PP 42-51. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Drug Quantity Table requires its highest Offense Level of 38 if 
the defendant is responsible for "1.5 KG or more of `cocaine base.' " 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(1). 
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Weston objected to that calculation, and claimed that he 
should only be held accountable for the 220 grams of 
powder cocaine that was delivered to Agent Hilton. At the 
first of three sentencing hearings, Farris testified that, 
based on his extensive experience as a seller of cocaine 
powder, he could accurately estimate the weight of a batch 
of cocaine powder from a visual inspection. After argument 
by the parties, the district court adopted the PSR's 
calculation that Weston was responsible for at least 1.5 
kilograms of crack cocaine (and 5 kilograms of cocaine) and 
was subject to a Total and Adjusted Offense Level of 40. 
The hearing was then continued to another date to consider 
another issue. 
 
At the second sentencing hearing, Weston challenged the 
trial testimony that he was an extensive crack dealer. 
However, the district court rejected Weston's challenge 
stating: 
 
       I presided over the trial and also over the [first] 
       sentencing hearing [at which Farris testified]. . . and I 
       was able to make determinations as to credibility. .. . 
       It seems to me that there's no reason to revisit my 
       prior ruling contrary to the defendant's position 
       [regarding the applicable drug type and amount]. 
       Neither Mills nor Farris can be found incredible. 
       Rather, they -- I found them to be quite credible as to 
       the defendant's position himself that he was aware of 
       and knew how to prepare crack cocaine . . . . My prior 
       ruling will stand. 
 
Even though Weston was properly held responsible for at 
least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine (and therefore subject 
to an Adjusted Offense Level of 40 and a Guidelines Range 
of 325 to 405 months), Weston challenged the Adjusted 
Offense Level and Guidelines Range by continuing his 
attack on Farris' credibility. However, the district court 
correctly pointed out that, even without any of the crack 
that Weston manufactured outside of Farris' presence, 
Farris saw Weston prepare approximately 200 grams of 
crack on one occasion alone.12 Therefore, based only upon 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. As recited earlier, Farris testified during the trial that he 
personally 
observed Weston convert a batch of "maybe a couple of hundred grams" 
of cocaine powder into crack. 
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those 200 grams, Weston's base offense level would be 34, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(3), i.e.,"At least 150 
G[rams] but less than 500 G[rams] of Cocaine Base."13 The 
district court then adjourned the sentencing hearing to the 
next day in order to consider additional documents that 
Weston had submitted. 
 
At the third sentencing hearing, the district court 
repeated that it "remained convinced of [Farris'] credibility." 
It also noted that the evidence established that Farris saw 
Weston manufacturing "a fairly substantial quantity" of 
crack on one occasion. The court noted that the evidence 
showed that Weston was asked to manufacture crack 
cocaine on a number of occasions, and that Weston talked 
about crack to Farris and Mills. Nonetheless, the district 
court concluded that the evidence failed to establish the 
amount of crack cocaine attributable to Weston with 
sufficient precision. The court explained: 
 
       [t]he danger is that although [Weston] may be a 
       substantial crack dealer, we don't know how much 
       crack he was actually providing, and we want to be 
       careful not to go from a reasonable extrapolation into 
       the possibility of conjecture, especially where the 
       guidelines are so severe. 
 
After reiterating that Farris testified truthfully about 
Weston's drug-trafficking and that the government had 
proven that Weston was a "substantial drug dealer," the 
district court decided that it would give Weston the"benefit 
of the doubt." Therefore, based on Farris' testimony about 
the volume of cocaine powder he and Weston purchased in 
New York City from Poppy, the court assigned between 3 to 
5 kilograms of powder cocaine to Weston. That attribution 
rested on a finding supported "by clear and convincing 
evidence," and not merely by a preponderance of the 
evidence. It resulted in a base offense level of 30. U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(c)(5). However, the district court continued to have 
concerns about the amount of crack cocaine involved. The 
court noted: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Guidelines Drug Quantity Table states that " `Cocaine base,' for 
purposes of this guideline, means `crack.' " U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(1), Note 
(D). 
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       As far as cocaine base, we know that [Weston] was in 
       possession of some crack cocaine. In the testimony of 
       Farris we don't have a calculation of the precise 
       amount. Was it, as the government speculates, about 
       200 grams? Was it less? You can certainly safely say 
       that it was some amount. I think that's encompassed 
       in level 30 as well as far as the defendant's activities as 
       a crack cocaine dealer. 
 
The government responded by reminding the district 
court that Farris watched Weston convert about 200 grams 
of cocaine powder into a like amount of crack on a single 
occasion. Therefore, argued the government, assuming a 
one-to-one ratio, Farris' estimate of 200 grams of crack was 
50 grams (or 33%) more than the amount required for 
application of a Base Offense Level of 34 under U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(c)(3), i.e., at least 150 grams but less than 500 
grams of crack. The district court noted that the 
government's position was "persuasive and reasonable." 
Nevertheless, the court "prefer[red] to base [its] ruling upon 
the clear amount of powder cocaine which is here rather 
than the extrapolation of the crack cocaine." The court then 
opined: "as I say, I may well be wrong. I don't know. I may 
well be too lenient, but we'll see whether people feel I'm too 
lenient when the time comes. I don't intend to be lenient." 
Finally, the district court restated its position that it was 
basing its decision on drug quantities involved only on the 
basis of the cocaine powder and not crack cocaine: 
 
       The government makes a very strong argument that we 
       should consider that there was 200 grams of cocaine 
       base when he was cooking it, and therefore, it should 
       be level 34. I say that is a reasonable position. I prefer 
       to base my ruling on the powdered cocaine level here, 
       but I do consider that, and I do consider [Weston's] 
       crack cocaine activities -- including that testimony 
       from Farris as to the substantial amounts of cocaine 
       and the testimony of Mills concerning crack cocaine 
       and [Weston's] own statements about the ability to 
       crack -- to cook crack cocaine. 
 
Not unexpectedly, the government argues that Weston's 
sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded so that 
the district court can hold Weston responsible for at least 
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the 200 grams of crack which Farris estimated he saw 
Weston manufacture.14 Therefore, the government argues 
that Weston's Base Offense Level should be 34. U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1(c)(3) ("At least 150 G but less than 500 G of 
Cocaine Base."). 
 
We applaud the district court's caution and candor. 
However, under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, it is clear that the Base 
Offense Level for a drug-trafficking offense is a function of 
the quantity of the drugs involved in the offense, see United 
States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1543 (3d Cir. 1991), and 
the Guidelines Application Notes require that "the total 
quantity" of drugs involved in the count of conviction and 
all relevant conduct "shall be aggregated to determine the 
scale of the offense." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, Application Note 12 
(emphasis added). The Application Notes further requires 
that "[w]here there are multiple transactions or multiple 
drug types, the quantities of drugs are to be added" using 
the drug equivalency tables. Id. Application Notes 6 and 10 
("In each case, convert each of the drugs to its marijuana 
equivalent, add the quantities, and look up the total in the 
Drug Quantity Table to obtain the combined offense level."). 
Similarly, the Guidelines Commentary provides that where 
"there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not 
reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing judge shall 
approximate the quantity of the controlled substance." 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, Application Note 12 (emphasis added). 
Consequently, the district court must "determine the 
amount and kind of controlled substance for which[the] 
defendant should be held accountable -- and then .. . 
impose a sentence that varies depending on the amount 
and kind." Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 
(1998). We agree with the district court's concern that 
"recognition of the need to estimate . . . is not a license to 
calculate drug amounts by guesswork." United States v. 
Paulino, 996 F.2d at 1545. "Instead, the sentencing court 
must carefully scrutinize the government's proof to ensure 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. By focusing on the crack cocaine Farris saw Weston manufacture on 
one occasion, we assume that the government has conceded that the 
evidence concerning Weston's manufacturing and/or distribution of any 
other crack cocaine is too imprecise to enable the sentencing court to 
properly calculate drug amounts, other than by sheer speculation. 
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that its estimates are supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Id. 
 
However, the district court's drug quantity calculation 
here cannot stand. The district court never doubted Farris' 
credibility. Evidence at the last sentencing hearing caused 
the district court to expressly note that "one time [Farris] 
saw [Weston] cooking up a quantity of which was not 
measured but which he saw and looked like a fairly 
substantial quantity." Yet, the district court was concerned 
because Farris, though credible, was unable to state"the 
precise amount" of crack that he saw Weston manufacture 
on that one occasion. 
 
As noted above, Farris' trial testimony established that he 
saw Weston preparing crack cocaine from "maybe a couple 
of hundred grams" of powder cocaine and some baking 
soda. Weston placed the mixture of cocaine powder and 
baking soda into a pot of boiling water and held the pot 
over a stove. There is no doubt that Farris was sufficiently 
familiar with crack to be able to properly identify the 
residue that Weston produced from the "couple hundred 
grams" of powder on that one occasion. Moreover, Farris 
testified at the first sentencing hearing that his experience 
as a cocaine dealer allowed him to accurately estimate the 
weight of a batch of cocaine powder based only upon a 
visual inspection. 
 
The government relies upon Farris' estimate of a couple 
hundred grams of powder on this one occasion, and the 
credible testimony that he could accurately estimate the 
weight of a batch of cocaine powder. Weston stated that he 
could produce at least an equivalent amount of crack from 
a like amount of powder. Thus, argues the government, 
Farris' testimony is sufficient to establish that Weston 
manufactured at least 200 grams of crack. 
 
The district court explained its reluctance to factor those 
200 grams of crack into Weston's sentence as follows: "In 
the testimony of Farris we don't have a calculation of the 
precise amount. Was it, as the government speculates, 
about 200 grams? Was it less?" Yet, the district court was 
convinced that Weston "was in possession of some crack 
cocaine," and appeared to be convinced that Weston "may 
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be a substantial crack dealer." Finding itself in a quandary, 
the district court apparently sought middle ground by 
finding that Weston was responsible for the powder cocaine 
and for "some amount" of crack, but found that the crack 
was "encompassed in level 30 as well as far as the 
defendant's activities as a crack cocaine dealer." 
 
However, that conclusion was erroneous. Since the 
district court found that Weston was responsible for"some 
amount" of crack cocaine as well as powder, it was required 
to convert each controlled substance into a volume of 
marijuana, pursuant to the Guidelines' "Drug Equivalency 
Tables," and then select the Offense Level that applied to 
the aggregated quantity of marijuana. U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, 
Application Notes 6 and 10; see United States v. Brown, 36 
F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court was 
therefore required to consider all of the controlled 
substances, of whatever type, that Weston was responsible 
for. Its failure to aggregate the drug types and quantities 
requires us to vacate Weston's sentence and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
The district court's conclusion that the crack was 
encompassed in the Base Offense Level of 30 is erroneous 
because it is tantamount to holding that Weston was not 
responsible for any crack whatsoever. A Base Offense Level 
of 30 would be proper if the district court had found that 
Weston was responsible only for 3 to 5 kilograms of cocaine 
powder. U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c)(5)("At least 3.5 KG but less 
than 5 KG of Cocaine."). However, once the district found 
Weston responsible for any amount of crack cocaine, it had 
to apply a Base Offense Level that would reflect that 
additional quantity of that controlled substance. 
 
For example, if we assume that Weston was responsible 
for 5 kilograms of cocaine powder, that amount of cocaine 
powder would place him in Base Offense Level 30. Under 
the Guideline's drug equivalency formula of 200 grams of 
marijuana per gram of cocaine, the 5 kilograms of cocaine 
would represent 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. U.S.S.G. 
S 2D1.1, Application Note 10, Drug Equivalent Tables. One 
thousand kilograms of marijuana is the ceiling for Base 
Offense Level 30. Consequently, any additional marijuana 
equivalents would require a higher base offense level. 
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Therefore, if the district court found that Weston was 
responsible for 5 kilograms of cocaine powder and any 
measurable amount of crack cocaine -- which is equivalent 
to 20 kilograms of marijuana per gram -- it would have had 
to conclude that Weston was responsible for more than 
1,000 kilograms of marijuana and it should therefore have 
applied a Base Offense Level above 30. 
 
Moreover, even if we assume that Weston was responsible 
only for the lowest amount of cocaine powder covered by 
Level 30 (i.e., 3 kilograms), that quantity translates into a 
marijuana equivalent of 700 kilograms. Thus, any amount 
of crack above 15 grams (the equivalent of 300 grams of 
marijuana) would place Weston above the ceiling for level 
30 and require a higher level. The evidence here certainly 
establishes that Weston was responsible for more than 15 
grams of crack. Farris not only testified that he saw Weston 
transform "maybe a couple of hundred grams" of cocaine 
powder into crack, but also testified about another occasion 
when he was buying cocaine powder from Weston on the 
street. During that encounter, Weston dropped a clear 
plastic bag containing 7 to 10 grams of crack on the 
ground. Thus, Weston was clearly responsible for more 
than 15 grams of crack. 
 
We agree that it would be highly problematic to attempt 
to attribute all of the crack that was mentioned to Weston 
for Guidelines purposes. That level of precision is not 
supported by the generalized estimates on this record. 
However, we conclude that the court erred in not at least 
attributing the 200 grams that Farris saw Weston 
manufacture. Given the totality of the evidence here, it is 
beyond debate that Weston manufactured and/or 
distributed, at least that much. We will therefore vacate 
Weston's sentence and remand for the district court to 
make an appropriate determination of Weston's Base 
Offense Level in light of our discussion.15, 16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We take no position on the government's claim that on remand the 
district court should resentence Weston using a Base Offense Level of 
34. The district court can best make that determination in the first 
instance. 
 
16. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supreme 
Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that 
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V. BOONE'S APPEAL 
 
Boone makes six arguments in his appeal. We consider 
each separately. 
 
1. The District Court Erred by Admitting Evidence of 
       Boone's Prior Drug-Trafficking. 
 
Boone's defense at trial was that even though he 
accepted $100 dollars to deliver a bag that happened to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Apprendi was not raised as an issue by Weston and was only 
briefly alluded to at oral argument. However, in an over-abundance of 
caution, we do think that a short discussion of Apprendi is warranted. 
 
The superseding indictment charged Weston, Boone, Farris and Jones 
with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more 
than 5 grams of cocaine base (crack) and more than 200 grams of 
cocaine contrary to 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. 
As noted above, the government filed an enhanced penalty information 
against Weston, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. SS 841(b)(1)(B) and 851(a)(1). That 
information referenced a 1992 state felony conviction for possession of 
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and Weston does not now 
challenge that enhancement. As a consequence of his conviction, Weston 
faces a possible statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment. See 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B) ("If any person commits such a violation [of S 
841(a)] 
after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such 
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be 
less than 10 years and not more than life imprisonment. . . ."). 
 
We recently applied Apprendi, and reiterated the proposition that the 
limitations of Apprendi do not apply unless the quantity calculation 
increases the statutory maximum the defendant is exposed to. If it does, 
the calculation must be submitted to the jury and established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 
2001). Here, however, the district court's drug calculation on remand 
cannot possibly increase the statutory maximum. That maximum is 
already set at life because of Weston's prior drug conviction. See United 
States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 2676 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(Apprendi does not apply where application of Sentencing Guidelines 
does not implicate a fact that would increase the penalty beyond the 
statutory maximum). See also United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 
862-863 (3d Cir. 2000)(Apprendi does not apply to a situation where the 
district court decides a fact that increases a defendant's sentence under 
the Guidelines, but the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory 
maximum). 
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contain cocaine, he was an ignorant "go-fer" and did not 
know what he delivered. To meet that defense, the district 
court permitted the government to admit evidence of 
Boone's prior drug-trafficking activities pursuant to Fed. R. 
Evid. 404(b). However, the court gave a limiting instruction 
in which it informed the jury that the evidence was being 
admitted solely on the issue of Boone's knowledge of the 
contents of the bag, and to demonstrate his prior 
relationship with Farris and Mills. With that caution, the 
court admitted evidence that, on different occasions, Mills 
had observed Boone selling cocaine inside of the nightclubs 
where Mills worked. The district court also admitted 
evidence that Boone sold cocaine supplied by Farris. In 
addition, even though the government also tried to admit 
Boone's two prior drug-trafficking convictions into evidence, 
the district court limited the government to a stipulation 
that Boone had previously twice possessed cocaine with the 
intent to deliver it. Boone argues that the district court 
abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. 
 
Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part that: "Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . may . . . be admissible . . . 
for [certain] purposes, such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident." (Emphasis added). Under Rule 404(b),17 
evidence of other criminal conduct is "admissible whenever 
relevant to a case other than [to show] the defendant's 
criminal propensity." United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 
745 (3d Cir. 1996). The prime inquiry is whether the 
evidence is probative of a material issue other than 
character. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 
(1988). 
 
The prior crimes evidence was admitted to show that 
Boone was familiar with drug-trafficking practices and to 
establish that his relationship with Farris and Mills 
included drug-trafficking. The evidence demonstrated his 
"knowledge," "intent" and "lack of mistake or accident." It 
was properly admitted to rebut his defense of ignorance, 
and not to establish a propensity for criminal conduct. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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Boone does not complain about the limiting instructions 
the trial court gave. The court cautioned the jury when the 
evidence was admitted and again as part of the final jury 
instructions, and those instructions were adequate to 
address concerns that the evidence would be used for an 
improper purpose. 
 
Boone argues that evidence of his prior drug-trafficking 
offenses established no "logical inferences" that he knew 
the bag contained cocaine, as opposed to "stolen jewelry, or 
platinum dust." Boone's Br. at 9. However, that very 
argument illustrates the propriety of admitting evidence of 
Boone's prior drug involvement. The government correctly 
responds that evidence of one's familiarity with the 
subterfuge and concealment inherent in drug-trafficking 
was relevant to the issue of whether Boone may have 
believed the bag contained contraband other than cocaine. 
See United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135, 138 (1st 
Cir. 1990).18 
 
Finally, we conclude that evidence of Boone's prior drug- 
trafficking was harmless in any event. Farris testified that 
he asked Boone to deliver cocaine to Agent Hilton posing as 
"Malik," and that Boone agreed. Hilton testified that he 
received the cocaine from Boone in a manner that was 
characteristic of clandestine drug transactions and that the 
cocaine was plainly visible to Boone. Mills then testified 
that Boone acknowledged that he got involved because he 
was then actively dealing drugs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Ferrer-Cruz, the court stated: 
 
       Since one who has previous experience with drugs is . . . more 
likely 
       to recognize (and hence to know) that the bags' contents were drugs 
       that one without such experience, the inference at issue do not 
       involve character. . . . Moreover, the probative value of the 
evidence 
       . . . is quite high. . . . [A] juror might have though that the 
       government failed to prove anything beyond [appellant's] presence 
in 
       a car with cocaine; and, believing that the government failed to 
       prove [appellant] knew it was cocaine or that he intended to 
deliver 
       cocaine to the co-defendants, such a juror might have voted to 
       acquit. The evidence of a past conviction might have helped 
       convince a juror of guilt through its permissible suggestion that 
       [appellant] knew about drugs and drug possession. 
 
899 F.2d at 138. 
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Boone also challenges the district court's admission of 
Mills' testimony that between 1984 and 1986, he observed 
Boone selling cocaine inside the restrooms of two 
nightclubs where Mills worked. In pressing this objection, 
he concedes that the evidence was "minimally relevant to 
knowledge." He claims, however, that its probative value 
was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and it was therefore 
inadmissible under the balance required by Fed. R. Evid. 
403. Boone did not object to this testimony under Rule 403 
in the district court. We therefore again review for plain 
error, but Boone does not argue plain error even now. 
Rather, he spends a great deal of time arguing that Mills' 
testimony was incredible or unreliable. That was clearly an 
issue for the jury to resolve, and it apparently did so in 
favor of the government. Moreover, given Boone's"innocent 
go-fer" defense, this evidence was proper under Rule 403. 
 
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence. 
 
Boone argues that evidence of his knowledge of the 
contents of the package he delivered was insufficient to 
sustain his conviction. He insists that he "never shared a 
unity of purpose with Farris, and that he never even spoke 
with Weston during the time-frame of the charged 
conspiracy." He maintains that "he was never told, and had 
no dependable basis to know, what was in the package he 
delivered to Agent Hilton." Boone's Br. at 17. However, 
Farris' testimony by itself is sufficient to support Boone's 
conviction, and the jury apparently credited that testimony. 
Farris testified that he: (1) selected Boone to deliver the 
cocaine to Hilton because of Boone's long-standing ties to 
Mills and Boone's prior drug dealing for Farris; (2) told 
Boone that he wanted him to deliver cocaine and offered 
Boone $100 and an eighth of an ounce of cocaine for the 
job; and (3) Boone took the cocaine and agreed to deliver it. 
See United States v. Hernandez, 962 F.2d 1152, 1156 (5th 
Cir. 1992)(uncorroborated testimony of cooperating co- 
conspirators that they had conspired to sell drugs, and that 
appellant knew of, joined, and helped effectuate the 
conspiracy, was sufficient to support conviction for violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 846). 
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Nonetheless, Boone argues Farris' testimony is not 
sufficient because, according to Boone, on cross- 
examination Farris "clarified that he only told Boone he had 
a deal for him, and there was no specific mention of drugs." 
Boone's Br. at 17. However, Boone mischaracterizes the 
testimony Farris offered on cross-examination. When asked: 
"what exactly did [he] say to Mr. Boone," Farris testified: 
 
       That I had something for him, a deal going in on a few 
       days and I asked him, did -- did he want to be a part 
       of it or something like that. 
 
Farris failed to offer a verbatim recitation of what he told 
Boone, even though he was asked for one. Farris related 
only that he said "something like that." Farris' testimony 
was not an admission that he failed to tell Boone that the 
package Boone delivered contained cocaine. Moreover, this 
argument again establishes the propriety of the 
aforementioned 404(b) evidence. Assuming that Farris only 
discussed the delivery in vague terms such as "doing a 
"deal," it was important for the jury to understand Boone's 
familiarity with the kind of vagaries that could cloak 
discussions of a drug delivery. 
 
In any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
Boone's conviction regardless of any inconsistency in Farris' 
direct and cross-examination testimony. A jury is free to 
believe part of a witness' testimony and disbelieve another 
part of it. United States v. Prince, 883 F.2d 953, 958 n.3 
(11th Cir. 1989). Thus, a witness' testimony is not 
insufficient to establish a point simply because he or she 
later contradicts or alters it. See United States v. Stirone, 
311 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1963)(evidence was sufficient 
even though testimony of a government witness was to 
some extent self-contradictory). Furthermore, we review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict winner, and we credit all reasonable inferences that 
support the verdict. United States v. Riddick , 156 F.3d 505, 
508 (3d Cir. 1998). We will sustain the verdict if any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt based 
upon the evidence viewed in that light. United States v. 
Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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The jury here could easily have credited Farris' direct 
testimony that Boone agreed to deliver what he was told 
was a package of cocaine, notwithstanding any purported 
inconsistency on cross-examination. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support 
Boone's conviction. 
 
3. The District Court Erred by Not Granting 
       a New Trial Based on the Government's Failure 
       to Disclose Brady Material. 
 
Boone claims that the government failed to disclose two 
items of exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and he is 
therefore entitled to a new trial. 
 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that 
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87. The affirmative duty to 
disclose includes impeachment evidence as well as 
exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 
667, 676 (1985). In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), 
the Court wrote: 
 
       [T]he term "Brady violation" is sometimes used to refer 
       to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose 
       exculpatory evidence--that is, to any suppression of 
       so-called "Brady material"--although, strictly speaking, 
       there is never a real "Brady violation" unless the 
       nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable 
       probability that the suppressed evidence would have 
       produced a different verdict. There are three 
       components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at 
       issue must be favorable to the accused, either because 
       it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 
       evidence must have been suppressed by the State, 
       either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must 
       have ensued. 
 
Id. at 281-82. 
 
                                36 
  
The first claimed Brady violation is a statement of a 
confidential informant. Boone first learned about this 
confidential informant in the Presentence Report, which 
read, at P 9, as follows: 
 
       In early 1997, [law enforcement officials] received 
       information from a confidential source19  . . . that 
       several individuals, including THOMAS WESTON, 
       a/k/a Rasul; CURTIS FARRIS, a/k/a C-Allah; LARRY 
       BOONE, a/k/a God Supreme; and HERBERT JONES 
       were responsible for the distribution of significant 
       quantities of "crack" in the Asbury Park area. 
 
After he received a draft of the PSR, Boone, by letter dated 
May 12, 1999, sought disclosure of information relating to 
this informant. The government responded by informing 
Boone that the informant had stopped cooperating with the 
authorities before Boone was released from state prison in 
early 1997. In other words, the government conceded that 
the representation in the PSR that the confidential 
informant had provided information about Boone was 
erroneous. 
 
Nonetheless, Boone claims this non-disclosure violated 
due process. The argument is, however, somewhat difficult 
to follow. If the confidential informant made the statement 
about Boone, it certainly would not be exculpatory or 
material. On the contrary, if the statement was made it 
would have been inculpatory and not subject to Brady 
disclosure. In any event, Boone contends that if the PSR 
was correct, i.e., had the confidential informant made an 
inculpatory statement about him, he (Boone) could have 
called the confidential informant as his own witness and 
established that the allegations were false. He claims he 
"could have impeached the unknown informant and shown 
that Boone had been falsely accused of being an early 
coconspirator, which created a domino effect, causing Mills, 
Farris, and Agent Hilton to either lie or mold their stories 
to fit the framework of their target conspiracy." Boone's Br. 
at 19-20. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Stewart Mills, who testified at trial, is identified as a second 
confidential informant in P 9 of the PSR, and is not the same person 
identified in this excerpt. 
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However, Boone fails to tell us how his new twist on the 
"domino theory" would have exculpated him. Moreover, 
even if we assume that Boone could have somehow shown 
that the confidential informant had falsely implicated him, 
he has not even attempted to establish that Mills, Farris 
and/or Hilton were even aware of the informant's 
statement, or that they perjured themselves and conspired 
to "mold their testimony" to conform to it. 
 
Alternatively, Boone suggests that even if the government 
was correct that the confidential informant's statement was 
wrong, the statement was actually exculpatory because he 
could have used the statement to show the jury that he 
could not have been a member of the Weston, Farris and 
Jones drug conspiracy during the time he was in state 
prison. However, assuming arguendo that the statement 
would be exculpatory as posited, Boone has not shown that 
it was material. The test for materiality is whether the 
failure to disclose prejudiced the defendant, i.e., whether 
the failure to disclose undermined confidence in the 
outcome of the trial. See Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 195- 
200 (3d Cir. 2000). The fact that Weston, Farris and Jones 
were engaged in drug-trafficking prior to Boone's release 
from state prison does not negate Farris' testimony that he 
recruited Boone after Boone's release from prison for the 
express purpose of delivering cocaine to Agent Hilton on 
July 11, 1997. In fact, it corroborates that testimony. Once 
Boone agreed to the July 11th transaction, he joined the 
conspiracy. 
 
The second Brady violation Boone asserts involves a 
statement co-defendant Jones made to a pre-sentence 
investigator after pleading guilty. Jones told the investigator 
that Weston typically wrapped his drugs in brown paper 
bags. According to Boone, he could have used this 
information to show that the cocaine Farris received from 
Weston and gave to Boone was wrapped in a brown paper 
bag, thereby preventing Boone from knowing that cocaine 
was inside. However, Boone did not need Jones' statement 
to establish this because Farris testified that the cocaine he 
delivered to Boone was wrapped in a brown paper bag. 
Thus, Jones' statement would have been cumulative and, 
consequently, not material. See United States v. Burns, 162 
 
                                38 
  
F.3d 840, 851 (5th Cir. 1998)(non-disclosure of information 
that supported the defense theory that fraudulent billing 
was caused by untimely reimbursements by victim agency 
was not material because it was merely cumulative of other 
evidence elicited by defense on this point). Moreover, Agent 
Hilton testified that by the time Boone delivered the cocaine 
to him, it was in a clear plastic bag. Jones' statement does 
not contradict that statement because the cocaine was 
wrapped in a clear plastic bag that was then placed in the 
brown paper bag that was handed to Boone. 
 
4. The District Court Erred in Instructing 
       the Jury That It Could Consider Evidence That 
       Boone Attempted to Influence a Witness as 
       Indicative of Consciousness of Guilt. 
 
Boone argues that the court erred in instructing the jury 
that evidence of the threatening letter Farris received 
(apparently from Weston, or at his direction) could be 
considered as consciousness of guilt. That evidence, which 
we have set forth above, was admitted without objection, 
and Boone does not challenge its admission here. Boone 
objected to the charge at trial, but was overruled. He does 
not now argue that the charge did not accurately state the 
law. Rather, he argues that the district court's charge was 
unfair and inappropriate. First, he argues that it was unfair 
because it "lump[ed] together" Boone's and Weston's prison 
contacts with Farris. Boone's Br. at 23. He argues this was 
unfair because Weston asked Farris to lie, but he (Boone) 
simply asked Farris to tell the truth. That is, Boone 
maintains that he asked Farris to "truthfully" state that 
Boone innocently accompanied Farris to the Collingwood 
Auction to ask Mills for a legitimate job, not knowing that 
Farris had solicited Boone to deliver cocaine. This argument 
again misstates the trial testimony. Farris testified that he 
clearly and fully informed Boone that Boone was being 
hired to deliver cocaine. According to Farris, Boone did not 
accompany Farris to the Collingwood Auction to ask Mills 
for a job. 
 
Boone's other arguments about the consciousness of 
guilt instruction are equally meritless. Boone claims that 
the instruction was unwarranted because "the government 
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placed their witnesses among his co-defendants in[the jail] 
. . . and continuous banter went back and forth to and 
from Farris." Boone's Br. at 44. Although Boone's point 
here is rather elusive, we assume (as does the government), 
that Boone is suggesting that the government attempted to 
entrap Boone by creating an opportunity for him to discuss 
his drug dealing in front of Farris after Farris agreed to 
cooperate. This is apparently based upon an argument that 
the government intentionally failed to segregate Farris from 
Boone and Weston after Farris began cooperating. Boone 
does not offer any proof to support this claim, and we fail 
to see the legal basis for an "entrapment" claim even if 
Boone had such evidence. Therefore, this argument must 
fail. 
 
Finally, Boone claims that Farris, not Boone, initiated 
their discussion in the library regarding drafting an 
exculpatory letter. However, that argument misses the 
point, and is also contradicted by Farris' testimony. The 
fact that the defense presented other prison inmates who 
claimed that Farris admitted to them that Weston and 
Boone were not guilty of the charges only created a jury 
question regarding Farris' credibility. The court properly left 
that question to the jury. 
 
5. The District Court Erred by Not Charging 
       That a Single Transaction Does Not Establish 
       Conspiracy Membership, or That a Member Can 
       Constructively Terminate His Membership. 
 
Boone argues that the district court improperly denied 
his request for an instruction that his involvement in a 
single transaction did not prove that he was guilty of 
conspiracy. He relies upon our decision in United States v. 
Price, 13 F.3d 711, 726-29 (3d Cir. 1994). There, we 
reversed a jury instruction that a defendant could be guilty 
of conspiring to distribute cocaine by offering to buy 
cocaine from a member of the conspiracy, even if the buyer 
had no intention of reselling the cocaine. Here, however, 
Boone did not buy drugs; he delivered them. Thus, Price 
does not help him. In fact, the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that Boone was brought into the conspiracy 
to deliver Weston's cocaine, collect the purchase price and 
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remit it to Farris. Boone was only to be paid if he delivered 
the cocaine, and Weston and Farris would receive the 
money only if Boone delivered the cocaine and collected the 
sales price. This is sufficient to prove a conspiracy. See 
United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1292 (3d Cir. 
1984). Accordingly, the district court properly denied the 
requested instruction. 
 
Moreover, the evidence refutes Boone's claim that he was 
only involved in one illegal act. Farris selected Boone to 
deliver cocaine to "Malik" on July 11th because Boone had 
previously delivered cocaine for Farris and because Boone 
was friendly with Mills. Farris' subsequent attempt to use 
Boone for another delivery to "Malik" on August 1, was 
stymied only because Farris could not find Boone. 
Meanwhile, Boone was assuring Mills that he (Boone) could 
provide Mills with large amounts of cocaine to sell. This 
evidence establishes Boone as a member of an ongoing 
conspiracy; not a one-time participant. 
 
The district court instructed the jury that, after joining a 
conspiracy, a person may terminate his involvement only by 
"an affirmative act of termination . . . withdrawal or 
disassociation." Boone argued that he was entitled to a 
"constructive termination" instruction based on the 
argument that he constructively terminated his 
membership in the conspiracy by participating in only one 
transaction. He has presented no authority for that rather 
novel proposition, and we are not aware of any. Rather, we 
believe the district court accurately stated the law. Boone 
was required to make a prima facie showing of affirmative 
acts to defeat or disavow his membership in the conspiracy. 
Such acts of disavowal include making a full confession to 
authorities or renouncing the conspiracy to the co- 
conspirators. United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 582 (3d 
Cir. 1995). The mere cessation of activity is insufficient to 
establish withdrawal. Id. at 582. Boone did nothing to 
attempt to withdraw. Therefore, the district court did not 
err in refusing to give the requested jury instruction. 
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6. The District Court Erred by Finding 
       that Boone Did Not Accept Responsibility 
       for his Crime. 
 
Finally, Boone claims that the district court committed 
clear error by finding that he did not "accept responsibility" 
for his crimes and declining to reduce his Offense Level 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. A defendant seeking a 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility bears the burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
or she is entitled to the reduction, and we review the 
district court's denial of the reduction for clear error. United 
States v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The district court's denial of the reduction is entitled to 
"great deference" because "[t]he sentencing judge is in a 
unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of 
responsibility." U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1, Application Note 5. 
 
Boone's claim of acceptance of responsibility is hard to 
take seriously. It is based upon a statement he gave to 
investigators after he was arrested that he now argues was 
"in all respects a complete confession." Boone's Br. at 28. 
After his arrest, Boone waived his Miranda rights and 
agreed to give a statement to investigators. In that 
statement he claimed that, on July 11, 1997, Farris asked 
him to do a favor and "give this guy a package." Boone said 
he agreed, and Farris drove Boone to the Collingwood 
Auction. Boone admitted that he delivered the package, and 
that he skimmed $100 from the money that he received 
from "Malik." He denied any knowledge of Farris' cocaine 
supplier. Boone did not admit that he committed the 
charged offenses, and he did not admit that he knew the 
package contained cocaine. Given the evidence here, his 
"cooperation" is more a false exculpatory statement than an 
acceptance of responsibility. A defendant does not earn the 
acceptance of responsibility reduction simply by speaking 
to investigators. See United States v. DeLeon-Rodriquez, 70 
F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995)(district court did not commit 
plain error by denying acceptance reduction where 
appellant's pre-trial statement to investigators stopped 
short of a full confession). Continuing his game of"cat and 
mouse," Boone argues that he did not admit that he knew 
that the package contained drugs because he was not 
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specifically asked by the investigators. However, we cannot 
help but cast a particularly jaundiced eye on that assertion 
because it strikes us as nothing more than a post-hoc 
fabrication to buttress his appeal. 
 
Boone would be hard pressed to demonstrate that he 
accepted responsibility even with his post-arrest statement. 
He seeks the benefit of the portion of U.S.S.G.S 3E1.1 
Application Note 2, that provides that "where a defendant 
goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate 
to factual guilt (e. g., to make a constitutional challenge to 
a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to 
his conduct)", a defendant may be entitled to the 
acceptance of responsibility reduction. That provision is of 
no avail here. 
 
Initially, Boone attempted to rely on the panel opinion in 
United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 
1998)(Singleton I), which held that the government was 
barred from making promises of leniency to cooperating 
witnesses in exchange for their truthful testimony against 
a defendant. Thus, he filed a pre-trial motion seeking to 
suppress Mills' testimony based on Singleton I . He concedes 
that his suppression motion was probably a dead letter by 
the time of trial because the panel decision had been 
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit en 
banc. 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (Singleton II).20 Nonetheless, 
he claims that even though the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit repudiated Singleton I by the time of his trial, 
we had not as yet addressed the issue.21  Thus, he argues 
that he continued to fall under the exception explained in 
Application Note 2. 
 
However, we are hard pressed to see how Boone could 
seriously argue for an acceptance of responsibility 
reduction. He opposed the admission of relevant, 
inculpatory evidence, and challenged as incredible the 
testimony of government witnesses Mills, Farris and Agent 
Hilton. We think the law is clear that such actions are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The Supreme Court later denied a petition for certiorari. 527 U.S. 
1024 (1999). 
 
21. When this appeal was argued we had decided United States v. Hunte, 
193 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999) in which we rejected Singleton I. 
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inconsistent with the "acceptance of responsibility" 
reduction in the Guidelines. United States v. DeLeon- 
Rodriquez, 70 F.3d at 767 (acceptance of responsibility 
reduction properly denied because appellant challenged the 
admission of and accuracy of the government's trial 
evidence, and argued for a verdict of not guilty). 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm Boone's 
sentence of judgment and conviction and will affirm 
Weston's conviction. However, we will vacate Weston's 
sentence and remand solely for the district court to 
determine his Base Offense Level consistent with our 
opinion. 
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